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Recent Consumer Protection Legislation in Ohio
Thomas D. Buckley, Jr.*
C ONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION IN OHIO is not new. The Print-
ers Ink statute' promulgated in 1911 by the advertising trade mag-
azine of that name, and adopted here and in forty-four other states,
2
makes false advertising a crime. The state food and drug laws also
provide criminal penalties for particular deceptive practices.' Pro-
hibition against "short" weights and measures4 is a form of consumer
protection. The Retail Installment Sales Act' regulates the credit
aspect of sales to ultimate users of goods and services. The Deceptive
Trade Practice Act 6 subjects certain sales techniques to injunction.
There is even a form of "truth-in-labeling"7 statute explicitly made
applicable to consumer packages. And consumer interests are relevant
to a number of miscellaneous8 state statutory provisions such as those
dealing with the redemption of trading stamps, 9 the rights of credit
card holders, 11 and the marketing of insurance" and other services 2
B.A, Fordham Univ.; J.D., Yale Univ.; Member of Ill. and North Dakota Bars; Assoc.
Prof. of Law, Cleveland State Uni'., College of Law.
1OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2911.41 (Page 1954).
See Noic, Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLUm, L. REv, 1018, 1058 (1956).
3OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§3715.52 & 3715.99 (Page 1971); see Carpenter, Conssamer Pro-
tection in Ohio Against False Advertising and Deceptive Prac;ices, 32 OHIO ST. L. J. 1
(1971).
4 0Hio REV. CODE ANN. §1327.42 (Page 1972).
51d. at §§1317.01 et seq.
6Omso REv. CODE ANN- §§4165.01 et seq. (Page Supp. 1972).
7OHio REV. CODE ANN. §1327.44(A) (Page Supp. 1972). Bat the provision forbidding
the use of containers which mislead as to the quantity is not made applicable to consumer
packages.
8 OHio REV. Coos ANN. §1333.60 (Page Supp. 1972) provides that "Where any mer-
chandise is offered for sale by means of its voluntary delivery to an offeree who has
neither ordered it nor requested it, the delivery of such merchandise constitutes an uncon-
ditional gift to the recipient."
90HIO REV. CODE ANN. §1333_02 (Page 1972).
1 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §1319.01 (Page Supp. 1972).
"1OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3999.08 (Page 1971).
12E.g., OHIO REy. CODE ANN. §§3731.12 & 3731.16 (Page 1971), provide that at least
two sheets be supplied to each hotel guest, and that hotel rates be posted conspicuously
in each hotel room.
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traditionally subjected to state regulations, Recently enacted federal
laws also bear on consumer interests ;13 and some local consumer pro-
tection is also available. 4
This array of state consumer legislation has been of limited im-
portance for several reasons. Some only apply to particular industries
or types of transactions (e.g., food and drug industry; credit card
transactions1 ), some to a limited form of sellers' abuse (e.g., adver-
tising16), and much of it cannot be invoked directly by a consumer,
but instead is enforced by public authorities 17 or, in the case of the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, by non-consumers) 8 Therefore, most
aspects of consumer transactions have been subject not to a special-
ized "consumer law" but to the all-purpose commercial law applicable
to sales and related transactions of all kinds. In a suit between a con-
sumer and a merchant or finance agency, a combination of the Uni-
form Commercial Code and general contract law principles govern
the rights of the parties with respect to such fundamentals as contract
formation, freedom of contract, and remedies. Moreover, there is, in
general, no forum other than a private law suit for the resolution of
particular consumer grievances concerning merchants or financers.
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code deliberately did
not attempt comprehensive treatment of the particular problems
which arise in the consumer context.19 Vestigial traces of their initial,
but soon abandoned, intent to deal thoroughly with consumer prob-
lems can be found in Article 9's preservation of the "consumer goods"
"E.g., Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1451 er, seq. (Supp. 1973); Truth
in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §1601-1613, 1631-1644, 1671-1677 (Supp. 1973); Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681 (Supp. 1973).
1"E.g., CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND §§1.1931 & 1.1932; &
§§12.0101-12.1102, establish an Office of Consumer Affairs and provide for a Cleveland
Consumer Protection Code.
"O5HIO REV. CODE ANN. §§3715.01 et. seq. (Page 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§1319.01 et. seq. (Page Supp. 1972).
16OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §2911-41 (Page 1954).
"E.g, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3715.69 et. seq. (Page 1971), places aesponsibility for
enforcement of the Pure Food and Drug Laws on the Director of Agriculture, the Public
Health Council, and the Board of Pharmacy.
1" A person "likely to be damaged" by defendant's violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act is entitled to an injunction "under the principles of equity." OHIO REV. CODE ANN,
§4165.03 (Page Supp. 1972). While the Act was intended originally to control business
torts, a plaintiff's standing does not depend on "competition" between the parties. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §4165.02 (Page Supp. 1972). See Carpenter, supra note 3, at 10.
Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine how a consumer sufficientiy aware of defendant's
deceptive practices to seek to enjoin them is likely to be damaged by their continuation,
nor how irreparable injury could be proven, since such a consumer could be protected
against damage by refusing to trade with defendant in the future. However, one of the
principal drafters of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act argues that consumers might
claim a necessity or intent to deal with defendant in the future and in that way establish
likelihood of damage. Dole, Consumer Ciass Actions Under the Unijorm Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, 1968 DUKE L. J. 1101 (1968).
19 G. GILMORE, SECURITY IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §9.2, at 293-94 (1965).
[Vol. 22:393
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concept for limited special treatment. 0 But the overall approach of
the Code is suggested by §9-206 which contemplates a "statute or de-
cision [outside the Code] which establishes a different rule for ...
consumer goods."'" Other hands, such as the state legislators or other
uniform draftsmen, were expected to deal definitively, in other
statutes, with consumer transactions and consumer interests.
The Ohio legislature has begun to respond to that invitation from
the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code, and to the increasing
pressure from consumers and their representatives, for laws which
take into account the relative bargaining powers and other special
characteristics of consumers and merchants.
The result has been passage of Ohio's version of the Uniform
Consumers Sales Practice Act,23 effective July 14, 1972; enactment of
the Home Solicitation Sale Act,24 effective January 1, 1973; Ohio
House Bill No. 350, Session 1972-73, 25 effective April 4, 1973; and
amended Substitute House Bill 243, Session 1973-74, 26 effective Jan-
uary 1, 1974. House Bill No. 350 modifies Ohio's law with respect to
the rights of third party financers of consumer purchases, and makes
changes in the right of a secured party to repossess consumer goods
after an alleged default by a consumer-debtor. Amended Substitute
House Bill 243 eliminates the "cognovit" judgment in connection with
defined consumer loans and consumer transactions.
Consumer Sales Practices Act
Ohio has adopted the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act,2'
with certain modifications in the form and substance of the version
promulgated by the Uniform Law Commissioners. 28 The Act affects
the substantive law of fraud, deception, and unconscionability rele-
20 "Goods are 'consumer goods' if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family or household purposes." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1309.07(A) (Page 1962);
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-109(1) (1972 version) [hereinafter UCCJ.
2
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1309.17 (A) (Page 1962); UCC §9-206(1).
22 Among the organizations which have participated in fact-finding hearings conducted by
the Consumer Protection Division, Ohio Department of Commerce, are the following: in
Cincinnati, South Western Consumcrs Association, and Women's City Club for Consumer
Action; in Cleveland, Consumer Protection Association, and Consumer Education and
Protection Association; in Dayton, Dayton Consumer Protection Association. FIRST ANNUAL
REPORT, STATE OF OHIO, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CONSUMER PROTECTION
DIVISION, Appendix A (1972).
-OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§1345.01-1345.13 (Page Supp. 1972).
24 
Id. at §§1345.21-1345.99.
2
sCOMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE OHIO REGULAR SESSION 1972 NEW LAWS, 639 et. seq.
thereinafter House Bill No. 3501.
'
6 COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE OHIO REGULAR SESSION 1973 NEW LAWS, at ---------
(unavailable as of this printing).
'See note 22, supra.
UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT, 7 U.L.A. (1973 Supp).
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vant to "consumer transactions."2  It provides for individual con-
sumer remedies, class action remedies, publicly enforced remedies,
and for remedies which combine individual and public elements. The
Act also provides for the establishment of a Consumer Protection
Division within the Commerce Department to administer the Act and
to participate in the public enforcement process. The attorney general
is authorized by the Act to investigate consumer grievances and to
initiate public enforcement proceedings.
The Act forbids both "deceptive acts or practices" 30 and "uncon-
scionable acts or practices"31 in connection with consumer transac-
tions. Its approach to the two categories of prohibited practices is
different. Section 1345.02 lists a series 2 of practices which are de-
clared "deceptive"; proof of the commission of one of these practices
establishes violation of the Act. However, the specific practices de-
scribed in §1345.02 are illustrative and do not exhaust the category
of prohibited deceptive practices. On the other hand, §1345.03, which
deals with unconscionability, also lists a series3 of sales methods, but
29 " 'Consumer transaction' means a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other transfer
of an item of goods, a service, franchise or an intangible ... to an individual for purposes
that are primarily personal, family or household, or solicitation to supply any of these
things." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1345.01 (A) (Page Supp. 1972). However, transactions
between consumers and the utilities specified in OHIO REv. CODE ANN, §4905.03 (Page
1967) examples being telephone companies, electric companies, and water companies, are
excluded from coverage, as are dealings with the financial institutions and insurance
companies described in OIO REV. CODE ANN. §5725.01 (Page 1967), along with
attorney-client and physician-patient transactions. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1345.01 (A)
(Page Supp. 1972).
30OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §1345.02 (Page Supp. 1972).
31 1d. at §1345.03.
a2OHIo REV. COlE ANN. §§1345.02(B) & (C) (Page Supp. 1972) provide as follows:
-(B) Without limiting the scope of division (A) of this section, the act or practice of a
supplier in representing any of the following is deceptive. (1) That the subject of a
consumer transaction has sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories,
uses, or benefits it does not have; (2) That the subject of a consumer transaction is of a
particular standard, quality, grade, style, prescription, or model, if it is not; (3) That
the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, if it is not; (4) That the subject
of a consumcr transaction is available to the consumer for a reason that does not exist;
(5) That the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied in accordance with a
previous representation, it it has not, except that the act of a supplier in furnishing similar
merchandise of equal or greater value as a good faith substitute does not violate this section;
(6) That the subject of a consumer transaction will be supplied in greater quantity than
the supplier intends; (7) That replacement or repair is needed, if it is nor; (8) That a
specific price advantage exists, if it does not; (9) That the supplier has a sponsorship,
approval, or affiliation he does not have; (10) That a consumer transaction involves or
does not involve a warranty, a disclaimer of warranties or other rights, remedies, or
obligations if the representation is false. (C) No supplier shall offer to a consumer or
represent that a consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other benefit as an inducement
for entering into a consumer transaction in return for giving the supplier the names of
prospective consumers, or otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other consumer
transactions, if earning the benefit is contingent upon an event occuring after the consumer
enters into the transaction."
Id. at §1345.03(B) (Page Supp. 1972), provides as follows: "(B) In determining whether
an act or practice is unconscionable, the following circumstances shall be taken into con-
sideration: (1) Whether the supplier has knowingly taken advantage of the inability of
the consumer reasonably to protect his interests because of his physical or mental infirmities,
ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand the language of an agreement; (2) Whether
(Continued on next page)
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makes proof of a supplier's use of such methods only a circumstance
to be taken into consideration in determining whether an act or prac-
tice is unconscionable.
Section 1345.05 empowers the Director of Commerce to adopt
rules defining "with reasonable specificity acts or practices" which
are deceptive or unconscionable. This rule-making power in effect
permits the Director of Commerce to enlarge the lists of deceptive
and unconscionable techniques which are in the statute.
The deceptive sales techniques which the Act identifies and pro-
hibits include misrepresentations which might find their way into
any sales pitch, and also more deliberate schemes to defraud. Thus,
in the first category, misrepresentations as to the quality,34 durability,"
age, 6 or endorsement 3 of the product offered are all forbidden. The
clearly premeditated techniques which the Act prohibits are fake fire
sales, 8 referral sales schemes,39 and bait-and-switch advertising.40 The
protection of the Act extends into the period after sale.41 Assurances
given in reaction to consumer complaints, and threats made to stifle
complaints, can both constitute violations.
The Ohio Act's treatment of unconscionability makes a significant
departure to the consumer's detriment, from the Uniform text. Even
to make out a "circumstance" to be taken into consideration in deter-
mining unconscionability, it must be shown under §1345.03 that the
supplier "knew" what the impact of its behavior would be, or that
the supplier "knowingly" engaged in proscribed behavior. The Uni-
form text requires instead that the supplier 'knew or had reason to
know"'" (emphasis supplied). The official comment states that, under
(Continued from preceding page)
the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction was entered into that the price was
substantially in excess of the price at which similar property or services were readily obtain-
able in similar consumer transactions by like consumers; (3) Whether the supplier knew
at the time the consumer transaction was entered into of the inability of the consumer
to receive a substantial beneit from the subject of the consumer transaction; (4) Whether
the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction was entered into that there was
no reasonable probability of payment of the obligation in full by the consumer; (5)
Whether the supplier required the consumer to enter into a consumer transaction on terms
the supplier knew were substantially one-sided in favor of the supplier; (6) Whether
the supplier knowingly made a misleading statement of opinion on which the consumer
was likely to rely to his detriment."
'4Id at §1345.02(B) (2).
3Id. at §1345,02 (B) (7).
3 Id. at §1345.02(B) (3).
3Id. at §1345.02(B) (9).
3 Id. at §1345.02 (B) (4); UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT §3 (b) (4), CoM-
MISSIONER'S COMMENT, 7 U.L.A. (1973 Supp).
3e OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1345.02(C) (Page Supp. 1972).
1'Id. at §1345.02(B) (6); UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICeS ACT §3(b) (6), COM-
MISSIONER'S COMMENT, 7 U.L.A. (1973 Supp).
41OHIO REV. COnE ANN. §§1345.02(A) & 1345.03(A) (Page Supp. 1972).
"' UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT §4 (C), 7 U.LA. (1973 Supp).
19731
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the Uniform text, a course of conduct often will establish the requisite
knowledge, and, in any event, scienter is not invariably required to
establish unconscionability. 3 Omission in Ohio of the "reason to know"
language, particularly because it is in the Uniform text, will make it
difficult to avoid proof of scienter under §1345.03. This deviation from
the Uniform text may have significance with respect to what is po-
tentially the strongest pro-consumer part of the unconscionability
provision. Section 1345.03 (B) (6) requires the court to take into con-
sideration "whether the supplier knowingly made a misleading state-
ment of opinion on which the consumer was likely to rely to his
detriment." This should be contrasted with the various misrepresen-
tations of fact which §1345.02 prohibits as "deceptive" practices. By
opening the opinion offered by suppliers to legal scrutiny and legal
sanctions, §1345.03 (B) (6) invites courts in determining unconscion-
ability to reassess older viewpoints on puffing, exaggeration, and
bragging as supposedly innocuous parts of sales pitches." To make
the Ohio consumer establish that the supplier not only knew that an
opinion would be misleading, but that the consumer would rely on it,
blunts the effectiveness of the Uniform text."
Proof of the supplier's actual knowledge will similarly undercut
the usefulness of §§1345.03(B) (3) and (4) by making the inability
of the consumer to benefit from the transaction, and the consum-
er's probable inability to pay in full, factors in the determination of
unconscionability.
Necessity for proof of knowledge may be less significant in con-
nection with price unconscionability. The requisite supplier knowl-
edge will not include information concerning the particular consum-
er's condition. Price unconscionability has been found by the courts
to include a broad range of deviations from the market standard."
43UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT §4(C), COMMISSIONER'S COMMENT, 7
U.LA. (1973 Supp).
"Keeron, Fraud: Misrepresentation of Opinion, 21 MiNN. L. REY, 643, 669 (1937): "In
truth, community sentiment does not condemn a vendor for using what has been called 'trade
talk' or 'puffing' to deceive a vendee who is a stranger, but it does condemn the same
action if the vendee was a close friend of the vender. The test, in all cases, is what the
ordinary ethical man would have done under the same circumstances, this fictitious person
being endowed with the crystallized sentiment of the community." See also Herbold
Laboratory, Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 342 (9th Cit. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S.
1039 (1969) (referring to "normal puffing").
45The uniform text would only have extended to opinions what is already the Ohio law
with respect to "facts." "1. In an action for fraudulent misrepresentation, it is not necessary
for the plaintiff to allege or prove that the defendant made the representation knowing
that it was false.'" Syllabus by the Court, Pumphresy v. Quillen, 165 Ohio St. 343, 135
N.E.2d 328 (1956).
'6Cf. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964)
(at most, an 83% overcharge, accompanied by interest and carrying charges of approxi.
mately 18% per year), witb Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc.2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d
264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (300% overcharge, plus finance charges), The test for price
unconscionability is not the seller's "mark-up," but the price at which other sellers make
similar property available to like consumers in similar transactions. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§1345.03(B) (2) (Page 1972).
[Vol. 22:393
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol22/iss3/4
RECENT CONSUMER LEGISLATION
The comment to the official text says that price unconscionability in-
cludes charging $375 for a $125 item, 47 an apparently studied illus-
tration of a three hundred percent deviation from a standard price.
If this is taken to be the threshold of unlawfulness, the concept of
price unconscionability will not be important. Courts should consider
not only such percentage factors, but also the absolute number of
dollars involved, thus reducing the percentage deviation required to
establish "substantial excesses" on big ticket purchases. A consumer
overcharged $250 on a $500 item has been victimized as much as the
consumer overcharged $250 on a $125 item. To the extent the appro-
priate standard price can be determined with confidence, there is no
necessity to allow for a large margin of error, reflected in a large
percentage deviation, in order to find price unconscionability.
While always posing evidentiary problems, proof of supplier
knowledge may not be an insurmountable challenge with respect to
unconscionability arising from one-sidedness of a consumer contract.
Excessive pro-supplier boilerplate is the evil intended to be reached.4 8
The Director of Commerce has promulgated detailed substantive
rules defining deceptive trade practices which constitute violations of
§1345.02.11 No substantive rules have appeared yet with respect to
unconscionability.
The most significant rule with respect to deceptive trade prac-
tices is the shortest. Rule CO ep-3-01.10 states:
Sale of Motor Vehicles - It shall be a deceptive act or prac-
tice in connection with a consumer transaction involving a
motor vehicle for a supplier of motor vehicles not to inte-
grate into a written contract all material statements, rep-
resentations, or promises, oral or written, made prior to the
written contract by his agent, representative, or salesmen,
to a customer. 0
This rule makes the existence of such prior statements germane
with respect to the commission of a deceptive act. Hence, even if the
parol evidence rule would have prevented the substantive content
of such prior statements from being made a part of the consumer-
supplier agreement, and thereby have precluded the consumer from
holding the supplier to the fulfillment of pre-sale statements and
promises, the consumer can nevertheless offer proof of such state-
4 T UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT §4 (C) (2), COMMISSIONER'S COMMENT,
7 U.L.A. (1973 Supp.).
4 JI. at §4(C) (2).
49 Rules COcp-3-0 1.0, et. seq. were adopted by the Ohio Director of Commerce pursuant to
§1345.05 (B) and Ch. 119, O11o REVISED CODE.
50 Id. at Rule COcp-3-01.10.
1973]
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ments in the demonstration of a deceptive practice. 51 As a result, the
consumer can avoid the contract as written; or actual damages might
be measured by reference to the content of such statements. In either
event, the parol evidence rule is rendered irrelevant. This handling
of pre-sale oral and written statements and representations requires
that the real bargaining process be reflected in the written agree-
ment, rejecting the fiction that, in the consumer context, the par-
ticular terms of written agreements have been the focal point of
negotiations. This rule should be extended from automobile trans-
actions to all consumer transactions.
The other rules which have been issued by the Department of
Commerce deal with: clear statements in advertising copy of specific
reservations, exclusions, or modifications which are relevant to the
advertised goods;" bait advertising;"l free gift advertising;54 terms
on which repair agreements can be entered into, and the representa-
tions made by repairers ;S5 use of prizes for promotional purposes ;s6
taking of deposits in advance of consummation of a consumer sale ;s"
representation of a used item as new ;5 failure to deliver promptly ;s9
and direct solicitation of consumer transactions.60
Remedies
More remedies are available under the Ohio Consumer Sales
Practices Act than under the Uniform text.61 However, at the outset,
all forms of remedy can be frustrated by §1345.11 which exempts
suppliers from liability under the Act for violations which result from
bona fide error.62 On this issue, the Uniform text is stronger because
such an error is not a complete defense; it only limits liability to
the amount by which the supplier was unjustly enriched as a result
of the violation.P This distinction between the wilful and the negli-
5 See Sparhawk v. Gorham, 101 Ohio App. 362, 139 N.E.2d 652 (1956).
52 RULES OF OHIO DIRECTOR OF COMMERCE, Rule COcp-3-01.02.
11 Id, Rule COcp-3-01.03.
4 Id., Rule COcp-3-01.04.
1s Id., Rule COcp-3-01.05.
56 Id., Rule COcp-3-01.06.
51 Id., Rule COcp-3-01.07.
8 d., Rule COcp-3-01.08.
s Id., Rule COcp-3-01.09.
60 Id., Rule COcp-3-01.11.
61 See Rice, Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act -Damages Remedies: The NCCUSL
Giveth and Taketh Away, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 369 (1972).
62 ".... (Ilf a supplier shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation resulted
from a bone fide rror notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted
to avoid the error, no liability is imposed." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1345-11 (Page Supp.
1972).
63 UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT §§9(B) (3) & 11(D) (2), 7 U.L.A. (1973
Supp.).
(Vol. 22-.393
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gent violation is drawn in the federal consumer credit protection act
as well." The purpose of the distinction, however, is not to reduce
liability. Under the Federal law, the negligent violator is not even
partially exonerated, and the wilful violator is made liable for ex-
emplary damages.
The premise for the Ohio bona fide error rule must be that when
loss occurs and both the consumer and merchant are "innocent," the
loss should be allocated to the consumer even when caused by the mer-
chant. This places the loss where its effect cannot be spread among
the relevant community giving rise to the risk; it places loss on the
party less able to control events and reduce losses in the future; and
it places loss not on the party that caused the loss, albeit through
good faith error, but on the party without fault. When the bona fide
error rule is combined with the necessity of proving scienter even
to make out a "circumstance" which a court can consider in deter-
mining unconscionability, the consumer's chances of prevailing are
seriously reduced.
As for the remedies themselves, an individual consumer can
maintain an action to rescind a contract,65 for actual damages,66 for
a declaratory judgment,67 or for an injunction," when the merchant
violates §§1345.02 or 1345.03 by committing a deceptive or uncon-
scionable act. An individual consumer can rescind, collect actual dam-
ages, or collect a minimum of $100 in lieu of actual damages for
violation of a substantive rule promulgated by the Department of
Commerce, or for commission of an act previously determined by
an Ohio court to violate §§1345.02 or 1345.03."1
Consumers may bring class actions under the Act for violations
of existing Commerce Department rules, and for practices which an
Ohio court has already determined to be violations of §§1345.02 or
1345.03.70 However, the relief in such a class action is limited to actual
damages; the $100 minimum damage amount is expressly made not
available in a class suit."
These private remedies provided in the Act are weak. There is
no provision for recovery of attorneys' fees in connection with either
individual or class actions. The individual action for rescission or for
64 CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT §616, 617. The federal act also provides criminal
penalties for knowing and wilful violations, §112.
6SOHIo REV. CODE ANN §1345.09(A) (Page Supp. 1972).
6MId.
11 Id. at §1345.09 (D).
60 Id.
6Id. at §1345.09(B),
70 Id.
71 Id.
19731
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actual damages will frequently be too costly to maintain, or its results
too negligible in terms of the consumer recovery, for such actions to
be numerous.72 Therefore, the lack of incentive for such suits will
reduce their utility as monitoring devices to secure compliance by
suppliers with the Act's substantive provisions. The class actions
which are allowed pursuant to the Act are limited at present to cases
charging violation of the Commerce Department's ten substantive
rules. The very detail with which most of those rules are stated may
serve to enable sophisticated suppliers to protect themselves by care-
ful avoidance of the particularized forbidden practices. Class action
under the Act is of little use to victims of the infinite number of as
yet undefined deceptive practices.
However, another class action, not specifically provided for in
the Act, is probably available to consumers. It is inferred from com-
parison of the Uniform text and the Ohio law. The Uniform text
provides that "The remedies ...are in addition to remedies other-
wise available . . . under state or local law, except that a class
action relating to a transaction governed by this Act may be brought
only as prescribed by this Act ...-74 (emphasis added). The counter-
part of this provision in Ohio omits the emphasized restriction on class
actions. 75 Presumably, therefore, consumers can maintain a class ac-
tion for any violations of §§1345.02 or 1345.03, and not only for those
violations already defined by the Commerce Department or by judicial
decision.
The availability of the class action to consumers injured by all
violations of the Act, and not only to those injured by violation of
Commerce Department Rules, is a significant advantage to consumers
under the Ohio law. The Ohio version further improves on the Uni-
form text by eliminating a special provision which encourages de-
fendants to make settlement offers in class actions, and provides no
incentive to make such offers acceptable,76 therefore enabling sup-
pliers to use it as a dilatory device.
Public enforcement of the Act is handled by the attorney gen-
eral, who can seek declaratory judgments or injunctions with respect
to violations of §§1345.02 and 1345.03. 7 The attorney general can also
bring class actions on behalf of consumers in matters arising out of
72See Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 47
(1969).
73 Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act -Damages Remedies: The NCCUSL Givetb and
Taketh Away, 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 378 (1972).
74 UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT §15, 7 U.L.A. (1973 Supp.).
75 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1345.13 (Page Supp. 1972).
76UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT §13, 7 U.L.A. (1973 Supp.).
77 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1345.07 (A) (1) (Page Supp. 1972).
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deceptive practices (but not unconscionable practices), violations of
Commerce Department rules, or practices determined by a court to
be deceptive or unconscionable.8
The Ohio Act also improves upon the Uniform text by eliminat-
ing a provision which restricted attorney general class actions for
statutory violations to a class consisting of those who had already
complained to the attorney general or the Director of Commerce. 79
This and the other restrictions on the use of the class action rendered
the Uniform text remedies extremely weak. The elimination of those
restrictions increases the effectiveness of the Ohio Act significantly.
The Commerce Department has, pursuant to the Act, established
a Division of Consumer Protection with responsibility for adminis-
tration of the Consumer Sales Practices Act. The Consumer Protec-
tion Division has already issued significant substantive rules applying
the statutory definition of deceptive practices.6 0
One of the most significant aspects of the Division's rule making
authority, is the opportunity it provides members of the public to
participate in the rule making process. "Any person may petition
the director requesting the adoption, amendment or repeal of a rule." '61
"Within sixty days of submission of a petition, the director shall
either deny the petition in writing, stating his reasons for the denial,
or initiate rule making proceedings.""2 This statutorily-imposed ac-
countability is limited, however, because there is no right of appeal
from denial of a citizen's petition.83
The Consumer Protection Division has also undertaken analysis
of the consumer fraud problems in the state, and has determined the
seven product and service categories which are most troublesome:
mail order, home improvements and services, automobiles, appliances,
home furnishings, vocational training schools, and mobile homes.0'
It is also responsible for reacting to direct consumer complaints.
The Division estimates its activities in that connection during its first
four months of operation account for the return of over $100,000 to
swindled consumers.E5
nid. at §1345.07 (A) (2).
"UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT §9(a) (3), 7 U.LA. (1973 Supp.).
a See text at notes 46-56 supra.
81 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1345.05(E) (Page Supp. 1972).
a2 Id.
I3d.
' FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, DivisIoN OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, (1972) at 3.
"Id. at 1.
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Home Solicitation Sale Act
This Act"5 gives a consumer an automatic right to cancel, dur-
ing a three day period after purchase, any sales contract within the
Act's definition of a home solicitation sale.8f Home sales must be evi-
denced by a written agreement which gives conspicuous notice of the
buyer's right to cancel." Cancellation itself must be in writing.89
The Home Solicitation Sale Act does not apply to: purchases for
less than $35.00; purchases which are made after negotiations which
began at the seller's place of business; any sales made pursuant to
pre-existing revolving charge accounts; or if the buyer initiated the
contact with the seller.90
The revolving charge account exclusion will remove from cover-
age customers who are most in need of the Act's protection- the
poor who are paid regular visits at home by salesmen who give credit.'1
Courts should not further restrict the application of the Act by find-
ing that a buyer who responds by phone or mail to an advertisement
has "initiated the contact" with the seller and therefore may not
cancel.
These exclusions are not consistent with the underlying rationale
92
of the Act, which differentiates homes sales from other sales on the
theory that high pressure techniques and coercion are more apt to
be successful in the home than elsewhere. The granting of a cooling
off period, and time or reflection after a sale is closed, can undercut
a consumer's claim niade later on, that high pressure, confusion, or
misunderstanding accounted for the purchase in the first place. Par-
ticularly with respect to the formal written content of documents,
consumer confusion will be harder to establish against a background
of seventy-two hours in which documents can be read carefully.
3
t6Oso REV. CoDE ANN. §1345.21(A-E) (Page Supp. 1972).
B71. at §1345.22.
8sd. at §1345.23(B).
491d. at §1345.23(A) speaks of "'writing."
91ld. at §1345.21.
91 D. CAPLOXITZ, THE PoOR PAY MORE, at 58-80 (1967).
" The Ohio statute is based generally on the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §2.501
et, seq., "Home Solicitation Sales." 7 U.L.A. (1973 Supp.). See §2.501 COMMISSIONER'S
COMMENT No, 2.
"Fraud in the factum, note 155 infra, will be harder to establish in the context of sales
solicited at home. In American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App.2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886
(1968), a "woman... with little if any business experience or knowledge, was approached
at her home during the hours of 8:00 and 10:00 p.m .... In those two hours there apparently
followed what is commonly called the 'hard sell.... "The misrepresentations made...
involved the nature and effect of the instruments signed ... thus ... the fraud was fraud
in the facrm '' There is no indication that the consumer ever examined the papers
she signed, yet the three day cooling-off period would arguably have provided her the
"reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of [their) character or it essential terms"
and, thus would defeat the fraud in the factum defense. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§1303.34(B) (3) (Page 1972).
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House Bill No. 350
House Bill No. 350 affects the establishment of security interests
in collateral purchased by consumers and the rights of consumers and
their creditors after an alleged default under a contract granting a
security interest. The Bill also makes changes in the holder in due
course rule and in the law dealing with a consumer waiver of de-
fenses vis-&-vis a third party financer. In addition, House Bill No.
350 multiplies the types of transactions covered by the Retail Install-
ment Sales Act.
Security interests in personal property, including consumer
goods, and the rights of holders of negotiable instruments, including
consumer notes and chattel paper, are subject to Articles 494 and 3,95
respectively, of the Uniform Commercial Code. However, House Bill
No. 350 effects changes in the law with respect to both areas prin-
cipally by amendments and additions to the Retail Installment Sales
Act." Relevant parts of the UCC are then subordinated,9 7 for covered
consumer matters, to the amended and new provisions of the Retail
Installment Sales Act [hereinafter referred to as RISA].
Effect on Retail Installment Sales Act Coverage
As a result of the changes it makes the law of secured transac-
tions and of negotiable instruments, House Bill No. 350 also changes
the coverage of RISA. RISA's definition of "retail installment sale"
is amended to include "every consumer transaction in which the cash
price may be paid in installments over a period of time"" (emphasis
supplied). "Consumer transaction" is a new concept in RISA, de-
fined as a "sale, lease, assignment, award by chance or other trans-
fer of an item of goods, a service, franchise or an intangible . . .
[except a sale or lease of a motor vehicle or mobile home] for pur-
poses that are primarily personal, family or household." While the
"consumer transaction" as thus defined is the reference point for, and
the subject of changes in, secured transactions and negotiable instru-
94ORio REv. CODE ANN. §1309.01 (Page 1972).
151d. at §1303.01-1303.78.
SId. at §1317.01-1317.99.
'7 House Bill No. 350, supra note 25.
98 'Retail installment sale' includes every retail installment contract to sell specific goods,
every consumer transaction in which the cash price may be paid in installments over a
period of time, and every retail sale of specific goods to any person in which the cash price
may be paid in installments over a period of time." Os-1IO Rev. CODE § 1317.01 (A) (Page
1972) as amended by House Bill No. 350, COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE REGULAR
SESSION 1972 NEW IAWS, 640.
"Except for the motor vehicle and motor home exclusion, the definition is the same as that
employed in the Consumer Sales Practices Act, See note 29, upra, for other utility and
finance company exceptions. The significance of excluding automobile transactions from
the act cannot be gainsaid. No service or product category generated more consumer
complaints to the Commerce Department's Consumer Protection Division during the first
months of its operation that thc automotive industry.
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merit law which House Bill No. 350 accomplishes, the inclusion of the
"consumer transaction" concept in the definition of "retail install-
ment sale" significantly enlarges the applicability of RISA in its
entirety. Prior to H.B. 350, a "retail installment sale" subject to
regulation under RISA meant only a contract to sell or the sale of
"specific goods", on the installment plan, at retail. "Retail" '00 means
the disposition of goods for purposes other than resale. Thus it in-
cludes consumer purchases, but covers in addition, all other sales to
ultimate users of products. "Specific goods""1 1 under RISA means al-
most exactly what it seems to mean - "chattels personal", plus (and
this is the only technical part of its definition) "related services".
Therefore, the inclusion of the "consumer transaction" (when done
on the installment plan) in the definition of retail installment sale
makes RISA applicable to personal property leases, service contracts
(for services unrelated as well as related to goods sold), assignments,
awards by chance, franchises, and transfers of intangibles (with the
sale or lease exception for motor vehicles and mobile homes) so long
as such arrangements are entered into primarily for "personal, family
or household" purposes. This means that all of RISA's requirements
with respect to the form of written contrats, 12 computation and
amount of finance charges,0 delinquency penalties,10 pre-payment
credits,105 credit insurance,"6 and other matters, 7 apply under House
Bill 350 to the leases, the service contracts, and other categories or
acquisitions within the terms "consumer transactions."
However, some ambiguity as to whether such an expansion of
RISA's coverage is actually intended is introduced by the reference
to the "cash price" as the amount to be paid in installments for "con-
sumer transactions" made part of the "retail installment sale" defini-
tion. "Cash price" 108 itself is defined in terms of the price at which
"specific goods" would be sold. "Contract of sales" and "sale" are
defined by reference to definitions in Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code which refer to "sales of goods." 1 9 Some question arises
100 H1O REV. CODE ANN. §1317,01(E) (Page 1972).
"I' Id. at §1317.01 (D).
'01Id. at §1317.04.
"IId. at §1317.06(A).
10414. at §1317.06 (B).
"I 1d. at §1317.09.
"IJd. at §1317.05.
701 E.g., filing fees; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §1317.07 (Page 1972).
""" 'Cash price' means the price measured in dollars, agreed upon in good faith by the
parties as the price at which the specific goods which arc the subject matter of any retail
insctaliment sale would be sold if such sale were a sale for cash to be paid upon delivery
instead of a retail nstallment sale." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1317.01(K) (Page 1972).
109 OHO REV. CODE ANN. §1317.01(M) (Page 1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1302.01(A)
(11) (Page 1972).
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as to whether "retail installment sale" as amended by House Bill No.
350 includes all "consumer transactions" for which a "cash price" is
possible; i.e., only those "consumer transactions" involving the "sale"
of "specific goods." This narrower reading of the new "retail install-
ment sale" definition would eliminate the leases, the service contracts,
etc., from coverage. That reading has some surface plausibility, even
though it makes the words "cash price" bear a very large weight of
meaning. The narrow reading should be rejected, however, because
it would render the entire "consumer transaction" part of the "retail
installment sale" definition redundant in light of the very next clause
in that definition. That clause is identical to the "consumer trans-
action""11 clause except that it says "retail sale of specific goods"
instead of "consumer transaction" and it adds the words "to any
person." Any "person" ' includes corporations and other entities in-
capable of having "family, household or person" purposes. Thus, as
to the "sale of specific goods" the last clause encompasses everything
in the "consumer transaction" clause, plus other non-consumer trans-
actions. Therefore, the only function of the "consumer transactions"
part of the "retail installment sale" definition is to make that defini-
tion include the leases, service contracts and other enumerated con-
sumer arrangements and to extend RISA's coverage to them.
The use of the term "cash price" in the consumer transaction
clause is unfortunate, since it introduces some doubt as to the scope
of RISA as amended by House Bill No. 350. Its inclusion can be ex-
plained, however, by the utility of the "cash price" concept, with its
good faith content, to forbid the avoidance of RISA's finance charge
limits by the setting up of phony prices for nonexistent cash sales.
The ambiguity could be removed by a simple amendment to the present
definition of "cash price."'12
The effect of the expanded application of RISA can be illustrated
by reference to the motor vehicle exception to the consumer trans-
action definition. Sales of automobiles on time are still within the
definition of retail installment sale, whether bought for personal,
family, or household purposes or for any other purpose except resale.
RISA's regulation of auto sales on the installment plan remains intact,
unaffected by House Bill No. 350; and, because all auto sales are ex-
cluded from the definition of "consumer transaction," security inter-
ests in automobiles and the rights of holders in due course of con-
sumer notes executed in connection with auto sales, whether bought
'IQ Note 97, seupra.
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANNr. §1317.01(B) (Page 1972).
" As amended to remove reference to "specific goods," "cash price" would mean "the price
measured in dollars, agreed upon in good faith by the pasties as the price at which the
subject matter of any retail installment sale would transfer if such sale were a sale for
cash to be paid upon performance instead of a retail installment sale." Compare present
definition, note 108, s pra.
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for personal, family or household purposes or not, are also unaffected
by House Bill No. 350. At the same time, a service contract with
respect to an automobile, if the service is for "personal, family or
household purposes" and to be paid for on time, is a consumer trans-
action and is, therefore, within the definition of "retail installment
sale." Thus, it is subject to both the old RISA law regulating finance
charges, delinquency penalties, etc., and to the new holder in due
course and waiver of defense rules established by House Bill No.
350 for "consumer transactions."
Establishment and Liquidation of Security Interests-
Consumer Transactions
House Bill No. 350 adds §1317.071 to the Retail Installment Sales
Act. Section 1317.071 sets limits on the rights of a seller in a con-
sumer transaction to take a "security interest." A security interest is
the special property right which a creditor has in particular property
(the collateral) of the debtor which assures payment by the debtor;1
a creditor who holds a security interest can repossess the collateral
in the event the debtor defaults.114 Section 1317.071 authorizes a seller
to take a security interest in the property sold, and in other goods
closely related to the sale, such as property in which the goods sold
are installed.
Section 1317.071 also deals with the "cross collateral problem."
"Cross-collateral" refers to the setting up of security interests in other
property in addition to the goods sold. Under §1317.071 the seller can
achieve a security interest in such other property if "as a result of
a prior sale, the seller has an existing security interest in the other
property. . . ."I's For example, in January a seller sells debtor an
anchor on credit, taking a security interest, and in February seller
sells debtor a bicycle, also on credit. In February, at the time of the
bicycle sale, seller can secure the bicycle debt not only with a security
interest in the bicycle, but also with a security interest in the anchor.
Section 1317.071 also authorizes the seller to "contract for a security
interest in the property sold in the subsequent sale as security for
the previous debt." Section 1317.071 is not clear as to when this con-
113 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1301.01 (KK) (Page 1972).
14 Id. at § 1309.46.
11 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1317.071 (Baldwin Supp. March 1973) provides as follows: No
retail seller, in connection with a retail installment contract arising out of a consumer
transacotin, shall take any security interest other than as authorized by this section.
A seller rnay take a security interest in the property sold, and in goods upon which services
are performed or in which goods sold are installed or to which they are annexed.
A seller may secure the debt arising from the sale by contracting for a security interest in
other property if, as a result of a prior sale, the seller has an existing security interest
in the ether property, and he may contract for a security interest in the property sold in
the subsequent sale as security for the previous debt. If debts arising from two or more
sales are thus secured or are consolidated into one debt payable on a single schedule of
(Continued on next page)
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tract can be entered into, but the pre-existing UCC law precludes any
creditor from taking a security interest in after-acquired consumer
goods unless the debtor actually acquires the goods within ten days
of the extension of credit by the creditor.116 Thus, if the January
anchor contract purported to set up a security interest, securing the
anchor debt, in any property which might be bought in the future
by the consumer, such as the bicycle, the security interest in the
bicycle would not be effective under the January contract unless the
bicycle was bought within ten days of the January contract.
Achieving cross-collateral security in this way gives an irn-
portant advantage to the seller. For if the bicycle is lost or destroyed,
the seller with cross-collateral security can still look to the anchor
as a source of funds to pay the amount owed on the bicycle. This
seller's advantage, however, can have catastrophic impact on the
buyer if the cross-collateral situation is left unregulated: "the debt
incurred at the time of purchase of each item [is] secured by the
right to repossess all the items previously purchased by the same
purchaser.11' If the consumer over a period of years has bought not
only the anchor and the bicycle but other things including a xylophone,
some yarn, and a zoom lens, at a total cost of $2,600, of which only
$100 remains outstanding, a default on the $100 debt would expose
the consumer to the repossession of all the many items purchased,
since the $100 debt would be secured by security interest in each item
purchased. The seller's right to repossess what might be almost all
the consumer's household goods would tend to discourage the debtor
from risking default, and this in turn would give the seller strong
leverage in negotiating grievances, for a $50 grievance, if not settled
the seller's way, could lead to the repossession of property of vastly
greater value. Unregulated cross-collateral terms were an important
(Continued from preceding page)
payments, and the debt is secured by security interests taken with respect to one or more
of the sales, payments received by the seller after the taking of security interests in the
other property or the consolidation are deemed, for the purpose of determining the amount
of the debt secured by the various security interests, to have been first applied to the
payment of the debts arising from the sales first made. To the extent debts are paid accord-
ing to this section, security interests in items of property terminate as the debt originally
incurred with respect to each item is paid.
Payments received by the seller upon a revolving charge account are deemed, for the
purpose of determining the amount of the debt secured by the various security interests,
to have been applied first to the payment of credit service charges in the order of their
entry to the account and then to the payment of debts in the order in which the entries
to the account showing the debts were made.
If the debts consolidated arose from two or more sales made on the same day, payments
received by the seller are deemed, for the purpose of determining the amount of the
debt secured by the various security interests, to have been applied first to the payment
of the smallest debt.
116OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1309.15(D) (2) (Page 1972).
117 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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factor in Judge Wright's finding a contract unconscionable in Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company,"' one of the earliest, best-
known pro-consumer cases.
Section 131T071 permits the taking of cross-collateral security
interests, but regulates their effect by providing that
"payments received by the seller . .. are deemed, for the
purpose of determining the amount of the debt secured by
the various security interests, to have been first applied to
the payment of the debts arising from the sales first made.
To the extent debts are paid according to this section, security
interests in items of property terminate as the debt originally
incurred with respect to each item is paid."'19
Thus, in the example above, by the time the zoom lens was purchased
and $100 remained due on the $2600 total purchase, the anchor, the
bicycle, and the rest of the $2500 worth of goods paid for would be
beyond the reach of the seller to repossess.
Section 1317.071 applies the same first-in first-out treatment to
goods purchased under revolving charge account plans. 20 With respect
to debts incurred the same day, payments are allocated first to the
smallest purchases,' thereby furthering the policy of keeping the
smallest number of items encumbered by security interests.
House Bill No. 350 further regulates the rights of sellers and
buyers in consumer transactions by forbidding "balloon" payments,12 '
and the use of several agreements with respect to a single item or
group of related items purchased at the same time, if the purpose of
the multiple agreement is to obtain a higher charge, or to avoid dis-
closure of an annual percentage rate.' A "balloon" payment is a
18350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
" Onto REV. CODE ANN. §1317.071 (Baldwin Supp. March 1973).
120 Id.
121 Id.
'
22Onso REV. CODE ANN, §1317.06(C) (Baldwin Supp. March 1973), provides as follows:
(C) No retail installment contact arising out of a consumer transaction and requiring
the payment of the charges authorized by this section shall be executed unless the combined
total of the cash price and all finance charges and service charges is required to be paid
according to a schedule of substantially equal consecutive installments, except where the
contract contains a provision allowing the buyer to refinance the contract under terms no
less favorable than those of the original contract after making the refund credit required
by section 1317.09 of the Revised Code. No seller shall, pursuant to any provision in a
retail installment contact arising out of a consumer transaction, accelerate any payments
on account of a default in the making of an installment payment that has not continued for
at least thirty days. Divison (C) of this section does not apply to the extent that the
payment schedule is adjusted to the seasonal or irregular income of the buyer.
12 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §1317.07 (Baldwin Supp. March 1973), provides in part as follows:
No retail seller shall use multiple agreements with respect to a single item or related items
purchased at the same time, with intent to obtain a higher charge than would otherwise
(Continued on next page)
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scheduled installment payment which is disproportionately larger
than all other installment payments. Since its magnitude makes it
unlikely that many consumers can pay the balloon payment when
due, the requirement of such a payment can be perceived as inducing
default. If the balloon payment is the last payment, the seller could
anticipate substantial recovery through the faithful payment of all
regular installments, followed by recovery of the item purchased
itself, if the consumer failed to meet the last, balloon payment.ln
House Bill No. 350's treatment of the taking of security interests,
including its handling of the cross-collateral problem and its pro-
hibition against balloon payments and the use of multiple agree-
ments are all derived from and, in most instances, follow the language
of the proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 5
Default: Repossession, Disposition of Collateral, Deficiency
Judgments - Consumer Transactions
House Bill No. 350 reduces the significance of a buyer's default
in a consumer transaction in two important ways: the seller cannot
accelerate payments,2 i.e., make the entire sum due under the con-
tract payable at once, until the default in meeting an installment has
continued for at least thirty days; and a seller's right to repossess
goods acquired in a consumer transaction is completely eliminated
when the consumer has paid 75% of the total cost (including down
payment) provided for in the installment contract.12 7
House Bill No. 350 also introduces changes in the rights of con-
sumer and seller, after both default and repossession have occurred,
with respect to the right of the consumer to redeem the repossessed
collateral,2 the seller's resale of the repossessed collateral, 2 9 and the
(Continued from preceding page)
be permitted by Chapter 1317. of the Revised Code cr to avoid disclosure of an annual
percentage rate, nor by use of such agreements make any charge greater than that which
would be permitted by Chapter 1317, of the Revised Code had a single agreement been
used.
24See e.g., Ruona v. freeway Dodge, Inc., 285 Minn. 23, 171 N.W.2d 212 (1969). Thirty-
five $80 monthly payments; thirty.sixth payment: $1,527.84.
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 7 U.L.A. §§2,402, 2.405 (1970).
126 OHIO REV. CODE ANN, §1317.06(C) (Baldwin Supp. March 1973).
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1317.13 (Baldwin Supp. March 1973), provides as follows;
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1309.46 of the Revised Code or any agreement
by the parties to a consumer transaction to the contrary, a secured party whose security
interest is taken pursuant to section 1317.071 of the Revised Code, shall not be entitled to
take possession of the collateral upon default by the debtor if the time balance at the
time of the default is less than twenty-five per cent of the sum of the time balance on the
day such retail installment contract was executed and the down payment recited in such
contract.
'lid. at §1317.12.
1'11d. at §1317.16.
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seller's right to a deficiency judgment (a claim for money due
from the debtor beyond what the seller can realize upon resale of re-
possessed collateral).
The UCC also regulates each of these areas. The Code rules re-
main in effect; House Bill No. 350 supplements them. The Code pro-
vides that after default and repossession, a debtor has the right to
"redeem" or reacquire the collateral any time until the creditor has
resold it or has entered a contract for its resale.131 This right cannot
be waived in the original agreement granting the security interest,
but it is subject to waiver in a separate writing after default.', The
debtor can redeem by tendering "fulfillment of all obligations secured
by the collateral" plus the creditor's expenses.3 It is arguable that
during the first thirty days after default, "all obligation" means only
the amount of the installment which is in default. Thereafter, how-
ever, the debtor must tender to the creditor the entire amount of the
debt outstanding in order to reacquire the collateral under the Code's
redemption provision.
House Bill No. 350 adds to this right of redemption an opportunity
to "cure" defaults which occur in consumer transactions."' The debtor
can effect this cure and reclaim the collateral within twenty days after
repossession or within fifteen days after receipt of a notice from
the creditor which sets forth the right to cure, whichever comes
later.'35 As is the case with the right to redeem, the right to cure
cannot be waived in advance in the installment contract; apparently
it can be waived thereafter, conceivably even before the default
occurs.'
The debtor's advantage in "curing," rather than in redeeming,
lies in the lesser amount which needs to be tendered to reacquire the
130Id. at §1317.12.
131 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1309.49 (Page 1972).
132 Id.
133 id.
'3'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1317.12 (Baldwin Supp. March 1973), provides in part as
follows: The debtor may cure his default within twenty days after the secured party retakes
possession of the collateral, or within fifteen days after the secured parry sends the notice
required by this section, whichever is later, by delivering to the secured party the following:
(A) All installments due or past due at the time of such delivery; (B) Any unpaid
delinquency or deferred charges; (C) The actual and reasonable expenses incurred by the
secured parry in retaking possession of the collateral provided that any portion of such
expenses which exceeds twenty-five dollars need not be delivered to the secured party pursu-
ant to this division, but shall be added to the time balance; (D) A deposit by cash or
bond in the amount of two installments, to secure the timely payment of future installments
by the debtor. The secured parry may apply such cash or the proceeds of such bond toward
the satisfaction of the debt in the event of another default by the debtor.
36 "Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary in a retail installment contract..."
(Baldwin Supp. March 1973); Cf., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1309.49 (Page 1962), on
redemption.
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goods. "Cure" does not demand tender of "all obligations" secured,
but only of past-due installments, plus a deposit equal to two more
installments to secure time payments in the future, plus delinquency
charges and the creditor's expenses. 7 The right to cure can be exer-
cised only once in regard to each debt.3 House Bill No. 350 also
provides that, despite cure, a creditor may retain collateral until the
debt is fully paid if there is reason to believe the debtor will make
the collateral inaccessible in the future.'39
House Bill No. 350's cure provisions appear to ignore recent de-
velopments in constitutional law applying to repossession. The right
to repossess is sanctioned by the UCC, which states that, in repossess-
ing, "a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this
can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action."'' 1
The "action" used to effect repossession has traditionally been re-
plevin. In 1972, statutes permitting replevin of property without
notice and hearing were held unconstitutional, 141 as violative of due
process. "Self-help" repossession, effected "without judicial process,"
has also come under attack. 42 The theory is that if a creditor who uses
the courts to achieve repossession must proceed only upon notice and
hearing, then a fortiori, a creditor who by-passes the judicial process
altogether, by relying on self-help, should not be permitted to avoid
giving notice and engaging in a hearing before retaking collateral.
However, the constitutional due process issue depends on the presence
of state action; and self-help arguably is the opposite of state action.
These developments render some of the default cure provisions
incongruous, although nevertheless operative, and cast doubt on the
legality of others. The notice to the debtor setting forth the right to
137 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.12 (Baldwin Supp., March 1973).
'3 d
,
l3'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1317.12(D) (Baldwin Supp., March 1973), provides in part:
A secured party who reasonably believes that a debtor intends to conceal or remove the
collateral from this state after curing his default may, within five days after retaking pos-
session of the collateral, move in a court of competent jurisdiction that he be allowed to
retain possession of the collateral as security for the debt. If the court finds reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor intends to conceal the collateral or remove it from this
state, it shall order that the collateral remain in the possession of the secured party, not-
withstanding the other provisions of this section. If the debtor cures his default, the
secured party shall not dispose of the collateral unless the debtor again defaults, and he
shall make such collateral available to the debtor when the debt is paid in full.
1O OHIO REV. CODE ANN. s1309.46 (Page 1972).
14Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Fuentes has been followed in Ohio. Turner v,
Block, Civil No. 72-1250 (N.D. Ohio, Feb. 16, 1973).
742Adams v. Egley, 338 F.Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Bank of America v. Oiler, 342 F.Supp.
21 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See Goodwin, Repossession and Sale After Default: An Old
Remedy Under Fire, 10 AMERICAN BusiNEss L.J. 221 (1973); McDonnell, Sniadach,
The Replevin Cases and Self-Help repossession - Due Piocess Tokenism?, XIV B.C. IND.
& CON. L.J. 437 (1973); Comment, Constitutional Law: Stale Action: UCC Self-Help
Repossession Provisions (§§9-503, 9-504) Violate Due Process Requirements, 57 MINN.
L. REV. 621 (1973).
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cure is required to be sent "within five business days after taking
possession" '143 by the creditor. The notice must set forth "specifically
the circumstances constituting the default."1" If the repossession has
occurred "by action," then the debtor should have already received
notice of the circumstance of default before the repossession. House
Bill No. 350 makes no exceptions for that situation, and requires the
creditor to re-notify the debtor again after the repossession. If self-
help repossession had occurred, then the "cure" notice would have
been the first notice the debtor received. The anomaly of a statutory
provision requiring notice after, rather than before, property has been
seized would seem to increase the probability of a court's finding the
state action needed to invalidate self-help repossession as unconsti-
tutional for failing to provide notice and opportunity to be heard.
The provision in House Bill No. 350 allowing the creditor to
retain possession of collateral, despite cure, is also of doubtful con-
stitutionality. 45 It provides that within the five day period after re-
possession, during which the notice must be sent to the debtor, the
creditor can move the court to be allowed to retain possession until
the debt is paid in full. If the court finds "reasonable cause to believe
that the debtor intends to conceal the collateral or remove it from the
state, it shall order that the collateral remain in the possession of the
secured party."'146 The statute apparently contemplates an ex parte
proceeding. It also seems to contemplate that no judicial process pre-
ceding repossession has occurred at which the likelihood of conceal-
ment of the collateral might have been explored. A post-repossession
ex parte hearing affecting custody of the debtor's property would
seem to suffer the same constitutional defects as a pre-repossession
ex parte replevin suit. This defect could probably be remedied without
amending the statute, by a judicial decision requiring notice, and an
inter partes hearing before allowing the creditor to retain repossessed
property despite the debtor's cure of default. 147
Disposition of repossessed property is also governed by the Uni-
form Commercial Code. The UCC disposition provisions are supple-
mented, for consumer transactions, by House Bill No. 350. Under
the Code, a creditor may dispose of property at either public or
private sale."' House Bill No. 350, by adding §1317.16 to RISA, re-
quires disposition by pubtic sale only, of goods repossessed in a con-
sumer transaction. The public sale must be preceded by notice to the
143 Onto REv. Co E ANN. §1317.12 (BaLdvin Supp., Match 1973).
145 See note 139, supra.
146Id.
147 See Neth, Repossession of Consumer Goods: Due Process for she Consmer: What's Due
for the Creditor, 24 CASE W.RES.L.REV. 7 (1972).
114 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1309.47 (C) (Page 1972).
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debtor at least ten days in advance of sale (the Code requires "reason-
able notice" '149) stating the time and place of sale, the minimum price
for which the collateral will be sold, and warning the debtor that a
deficiency judgment may be taken if what is realized upon resale
does not fully satisfy the consumer debt. 150
Under another section of the Code, the creditor may propose not
to resell repossessed collateral, but to keep it in full satisfaction of
the debt due.151 That section also provides that with respect to con-
sumer goods, a consumer who has paid sixty percent of the debt can
insist, nevertheless, on a sale by the creditor. Therefore, under House
Bill No. 350, the right of the consumer who has paid sixty percent of
his debt to require resale, would give rise to a right to require a public
sale.
House Bill No. 350 creates a question, however, as to whether
the creditor can propose, in any case, not to resell but to retain the
collateral in full satisfaction of the debt. House Bill No. 350 states
that "a secured party [in a consumer transaction] . . . may, after
default, dispose of ... the collateral, only as authorized by this sec-
tion. (B) Disposition of the collateral shall be by public sale." ' How
is this language to be reconciled with the Code's provision for no sale
whatsoever when the creditor chooses to iretain the collateral in full
satisfaction of the debt? Confusion is added by Subsection (C) of
§1317.16 which states that "except as modified by this section, section
1309.47 . . . governs disposition of collateral by the secured party."
This would seem to mean that the creditor's right to retain collateral
has been abolished. But that conclusion requires an assumption that
the parts of §1309.48 which deal with "consumer goods," which are
the major parts of the section, have been repealed sub silentio by
House Bill No. 350. Inasmuch as §1309.48's provision for retention of
collateral and consequent elimination of a deficiency judgment can
be beneficial to a consumer, a reading of House Bill No. 350 which
forces a sale by the creditor should be avoided. "Disposition" should
not be read to include "retention," and the possibility of creditor
retention of collateral in exchange for the creditor's surrender of the
right to a deficiency judgment should be continued.
Deficiency judgments are authorized by the Code.' 3 House Bill
No. 350 repeals5 4 §1319.07 (a provision not contained in the UCC)
'
491d. at §1309.47 (C).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1317.16(B) (Baldwin Supp., March 1973).
1 Onio REV. Cone ANN. §1309.48(B) (Page 1972).
15 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1317.16 (Baldwin Supp., March 1973).
'1OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1309.47(B) (Page 1972).
14 See House Bill No. 350, §2 (COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE REGULAR SESSION 1972 NEW
LAws, at 644), repealing former OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. §§1309.47, 1317.01, 1317.06,
1317.07, & 1319.07 (Page 1962).
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which made the taking of a deficiency judgment contingent upon the
same ten day notice of resale now required by §1317.16. The effect
of this repeal is to leave debtors in non-consumer transactions without
any right to notice of resale, but nevertheless still facing the pos-
sibility of a deficiency judgment if the resale does not satisfy the
non-consumer debt due. For consumer transactions, House Bill No.
350 explicitly provides in §1317.12 that a deficiency judgment is con-
tingent upon the sending of the "cure" notice to a defaulting debtor
within five days after repossession. Section 1317.16, while it requires
a ten day notice of public sale and a warning in that notice that a
deficiency judgment is possible, does not in terms make the deficiency
judgment contingent upon the sending of that ten day notice. These
two notices can be accomplished, of course, simultaneously.
Holder In Due Course Rule, Waiver of Defense Clause
Consumer Transactions
House Bill No. 350 also modifies, for consumer transactions, the
"holder in due course" rule and the law applicable to a "waiver of
defense" clause.
The holder in due course rule prevents most1 55 of a consumer's
contract defenses from being taken into consideration, in a suit
against the consumer by a finance agency which has acquired a prom-
issory note executed by a consumer to evidence credit extended at the
time of purchase. The finance company is a holder in due course and,
therefore, insulated against defenses that would be operative as be-
tween the consumer and the merchant, only if the finance company
acquired the consumer's note for value, in good faith, and without
notice of any defenses-'
The waiver of defense clause is typically part of the consumer
sales contract signed by the consumer at the same time a promissory
note is executed. The clause constitutes the consumer's agreement not
to raise against an assignee of the contract, such as a finance com-
pany, defenses which the consumer may have vis-iA-vis the merchant.
The waiver of defense clause achieves by private contract the same
result which the holder in due course rule achieves by operation of law.
House Bill No. 350 modifies the classic operation of the holder in
due course rule and waiver of defense clause by making the finance
company's insulation against consumer defenses contingent upon the
in However, infancy, other incapacity, duress, illegality, and fraud in the facmurn are the "real"
defenses which remain available even against a holder in due course. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§1303.34 (Page 1972),
'
56See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§1303.31, 1303.34 (Page 1972).
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issuance of a written warning to the consumer concerning the trans-
fer of his note or sales contract, and by giving the consumer the
opportunity to preserve contract defenses, even as against the finance
company which takes the note or sales contract, by responding to
the warning with a notification to the finance company of specific
defenses.157
The consumer has fifteen days after receipt of the goods pur-
chased, or fifteen days after receipt of the warning, whichever is later,
within which to notify the assignee of claims and defenses.13 The
notification from the consumer must be in writing."' To defeat holder
in due course status, the consumer's response must assert the existence
of a claim or defense and it must apprise the finance company with
"reasonable specificity" of the nature of the claim or defense.160 To
overcome a waiver of defense clause, the notice by the consumer must
give the "facts giving rise to the ... defense." 61 Defenses which are
not so described in writing by the consumer are not available should
the note-holder or assignee of the sales contract sue in the future.
Defenses which the consumer cannot know about because they do not
arise until after the fifteen day period are also not available to the
consumer in the event of such a suit.
The approach of House Bill No. 350 to the problem of third
party freedom from defenses resembles in part the reaction to this
problem found in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter,
the U3C162]. The U3C, however, almost completely abolishes the holder
in due course rule163 for consumer transactions. The effect of that
reform is significantly diminished, however, by its treatment of waiver
of defense clauses. On the issue of waiver, the U3C offers two al-
ternatives, its equivocation reflecting the sensitivity of the issue and
the intensity of creditor pressure on formulation of the act. Alterna-
tive A, the consumer alternative, makes a waiver of defense provision
unenforceable. Alternative B, the finance company alternative, makes
the effectiveness of such a clause contingent upon the issuance to a
consumer of a notice of the assignment of the contract, and the failure
157OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§1317.031 & 1317.14 (Baldwin Supp., March 1973),
159 Id.
10Id. at § 1317.031(A) (2) (Baldwin Supp., March 1973).
"I Id, at §1317.14(A).
162 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 7 U.L.A. (1970).
"' UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §2.403, 7 U.L.A. (1970), provides that a seller may
not take a negotiable instrument, except a check, as evidence of the consumer's debt. How-
ever, it is theroretically possible for a finance company or other holder of an instrument
to qualify as a holder in due course if a merchant has disobeyed §2.403 and extracted a
negotiable note from a consumer. In the unlikely event such a holder did qualify, it would
receive the benefits of holder in due course status.
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of the consumer to respond to the finance company with notice of the
facts giving rise to the consumer's claim or defense. Alternative B
gives the consumer ninety days in which to notify the finance com-
pany-assignee of claims and defenses arising within ninety days of
purchase. Alternative B renders the waiver of defense clause com-
pletely unenforceable as to all claims and defenses which arise after
the ninety day period.
The UC's alternative B, the creditor alternative, is obviously
far superior, from the consumer's point of view, to House Bill No.
350's change in the third party defense rules. Yet alternative B
is itself generally criticized by consumer advocates as inadequate.164
Recent legislation in other jurisdictions has gone much further in
providing consumer protection with respect to third party defense
issues.165
Is House Bill No. 350's treatment of the holder in due course
and waiver of defenses clause nevertheless better than nothing? Not
necessarily. The extremely grudging, nearly trivial concessions to
consumer interest which House Bill No. 350 makes with respect to
third party defenses may stifle judicial reform which was already
underway in Ohio. American Plan v. Woods66 held that the "close-
connectedness" of a merchant and a third party financer destroyed the
finance company's good faith and lack of notice as to consumer de-
fenses; the finance company was therefore not a holder in due course,
and the consumer's defenses were operative. The Ohio Court in ap-
plying the law on "close connectedness," followed the celebrated Unico
v. Owen"7 decision and did so on facts much less compellingly favor-
able to the consumer than those found in' the New Jersey case. Favor-
able reaction to Unico, and its absorption into Ohio jurisprudence, is
significant because the New Jersey Supreme Court in Unico also held
that a waiver of defense clause, in the consumer context, was un-
conscionable and therefore unenforceable. Statutory regulation of
the waiver of defense clause, as found in House Bill No. 350, makes
such a judicial development far more difficult in Ohio, if it does not
foreclose the possibility altogether.
There is yet another respect in which House Bill No. 350's treat-
ment of the third party defense issue is a bad bargain for the con-
16 See Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC,
44 N.Y.U.L.REv. 272, 272-73, 291-94 (1969); Murphy, U3C and Negotiability, 29 OHIO
S-r.LJ. 667 (1968).
165E.g., MASSACHUSErITS GENERAL LAWS Ch. 255 §12(F) (1) (1968) provides: -A creditor
in consumer loan transactions shall be subject to all of the defenses of the borrower arising
from the consumer sale or lease for which the proceeds of the loan are used if the creditor
knowingly participated in or was directly connected with the consumer sale or lease
transaction."
16 16 Ohio App.2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968).
16750 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
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sumer. It provides, with respect to a waiver of defense clause, that
"to the extent that under this section an assignee is subject to de-
fenses .. rights of the buyer . . . can only be asserted as a matter
of defense16 . . ." (emphasis supplied). This language, taken from
the U3C 169 was apparently intended to negate any implication that the
consumer could assert a products liability claim against a financer. 11"
Unfortunately, the provision also seems to prevent any positive action
whatsoever from being initiated by a consumer against a third party
for relief from the terms of a credit agreement. It is not uncommon
for consumers to seek such relief on their own before being sued by
a merchant or finance company. House Bill No. 350's artless method
of protecting financers against the improbable prospect of defending
a products liability suit adds a needless obstacle to consumers seeking
to vindicate their rights.'71
Amended Substitute House Bill No. 243: Cognovit Judgments
Amended Substitute House Bill No. 243172 invalidates the warrant
of attorney to confess judgment in connection with consumer loans
and consumer transactions. The Bill also provides for a special form of
notice to the consumer in actions founded upon instruments executed
in connection with consumer loans and consumer transactions.' 3
A "confession of judgment" or "cognovit" clause has two ele-
ments: (1) waiver of notice of any legal proceedings begun against the
debtor on account of the instrument containing the clause; and (2)
appointment of any attorney, even one designated by the creditor, to
make an appearance on behalf of the debtor and confess judgment
which may then be entered in favor of the creditor against the debtor.
Controversy over the lawfulness and propriety of confession of
judgment predates specific consumer objection to the practice. It is
168 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §1317.14 (C) (Baldwin Supp., March 1973).
169 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §2.404, Alternatives A and B both state: "Rights of
the buyer or lessee under this section can only be asserted as a matter of defense to or set
off against a claim by the assignee."
170See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, n.23, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal Rptr.
796 (1971).
171 Legislation has been introduced in the Ohio 110th General Assembly whih would extend
the period during which the consumer's defenses woeld be operative Nis a vis a third party
financer until the due date of the last installment owing to the financer. House Bill No. 88,
1973-74 session, Ohio General Assembly. Legislation has also been introduced to eliminate
the motor vehicle exception to the "consumer transaction" definition in the Retail Install
ment Sales Act. House Bill No. 359, 1973-74 session, Ohio General Assembly.
"' See note 26, sxpea.
"'The notice of complaint served on a consumer must state: "You have a right to retain an
attorney. If you do not appear at the trail or file an answer, judgment may be entakea against
you by default, and your earnings may he subjected to garnishment or your property may
be attached en satisfy said judgment. If your defense is supported by witnesses, account books,
receipts, or other documents, you must produce them at the trial. Subpoenas for witnesses
and subpoenas duces tecum, if requested by a party, will be issued by the clerk." Amended
Substitute House Bill No. 243.
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forbidden altogether in some jurisdictions, 4 is a crime in others,7
and is prohibited for consumer transactions in many places.17 6 Much
litigation has arisen in the context of full faith and credit, and en-
forcement of a sister state's confessed judgment has been frequently
denied, without respect to the capacity or business acumen of the
defendant-debtor.177
When made part of a consumer's finance agreement, a cognovit
clause provided the creditor with powerful leverage. Once the mer-
chant or creditor obtained judgment on the authority of the clause,
all adjustments, bargaining, or other negotiated resolution of con-
sumer complaints would take place, if at all, under the threat if im-
minent execution on the debtor's property. The burden, and with it
the cost of initiating legal proceedings, was also shifted to the con-
sumer who attempted to set aside or reopen the judgment taken
against him. The use of the cognovit clause had been identified as
one of the major sources of grievances in consumer transactions."'
Its abolition in connection with consumer loans and consumer trans-
actions was overdue.
The reform is not yet complete, however. Consumers are still
exposed to use of the cognovit clause in real estate transactions, such
as apartment leases. In addition, purchases made to start small, at-
home, part-time business ventures are not within the definition of
consumer transactions, although the possibilities for abuse and over-
reaching are similar to those found in personal, family, educational,
or household dealings."'
With respect to such non-consumer transactions, the warrant of
attorney clause remains effective. Since January 1, 1971, instruments
containing the clause must also spell out, conspicuously, in specified
colloquial "warning" language, the legal significance of the cognovit
clause. 10
"'ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §6-629 & 44-143 (1956); MASS, GEN LAWS. ANN. Ch. 231,
§13A (1956).
s R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§19-25-24 & 19-25-36 (1956); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§21-9-16 & 21-
9-18 (1953).
171CONN. GEN. STAT. RE v. §§42-88 & 36-236 (1958); MINN. STAT. §§548.22, 168.71, &
56.12 (1947).
"7 E,g., Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474 (1969).
178 National Legal Aid and Defender Association, DUE PROCESS IN CONSUMER AFFAIRS
AFTER SNIADACH (1971).
'"See generally Fischer v. Division West Chinchilla Ranch, 310 F.Supp. 424 (D. Minn.
1970), where a millwright, a farmer, a paper mill hand, and a housewife were among
those induced to become part time chinchilla ranchers.
180 The instrument must contain the following: "Warning - by signing this paper you give
np your right to notice and court trial. If you do not pay on time a court judgment may be
taken against you without your prior knowledge and the powers of a court can be used to
collect from you regardless of any claims you may have against the creditor whether for
regained goods, faulty goods, failure on his part to comply with the agreement, or any
other cause." OHIO REV. CODE ANN- §2323.13(D) (Page Supp. 1972). As amended by
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 243.
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This warning, then, must continue to be used in connection with
real estate and other transactions not within the coverage of Am.S.
H.B. No. 243. The warning message may be more harmful than help-
ful to those executing notes containing it.
In Overmeyer v. Frick,"' the United States Supreme Court held
that the Ohio pre-warning confession of judgment procedure was not
unconstitutional on its face, and that its application to the facts in
Overmeyer was also constitutional. The Court noted, without any
comment whatsoever, the enactment of the warning provision during
the pendency of the case.1 Overmeyer was not a consumer case. The
debtor was a corporation. "Its corporate structure [was] complicated,
its activities [were] widespread." ' it was represented by counsel
throughout the course of its dealings with its creditors. The cognovit
provision appeared for the first time in a note representing a second
extension of time to pay an already matured debt arising from con-
struction work done by the creditor for the debtor, Overmeyer, and
accepted by Overmeyer. The creditor released mechanic's liens on
Overmeyer's property, and gave monetary relief in the form of extra
time to pay and a more favorable interest rate at the time of the ex-
ecution of the note which contained the cognovit clause.
1 4
The Court said:
Our holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for
other facts of other cases. For example, where the contract
is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargain-
ing power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the
cognovit provision, other legal consequences may ensue.13 5
Another important consumer case disposed of by the Court on
the same day that Overmeyer was decided, Swarb v. Lennox,1"6 was
a class action which came to the Court on appeal from a three-judge
federal district court in Pennsylvania. The lower court had upheld
the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania cognovit procedure "pro-
viding there has been an understanding and voluntary consent of the
debtor in signing the document.'" 7 The three-judge court also decided
that with respect to the class of plaintiffs earning less than $10,000
per year, there had been no such intentional waiver of known rights,
and because "the Pennsylvania procedure with respect to the desig-
nated class was based upon a waiver concept without adequate
181405 U.S. 174 (1972).
1Id. at 175.
"s Id. at 186.
" d, at 186-87.
851. at 188.
186405 U.S. 191 (1972).
167 Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F.Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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understanding, it was violative of due process."1  The lower court
went on to declare the Pennsylvania cognovit procedure unconstitu-
tional prospectively for the class earning less than $10,000 per year,
and to enjoin entry of judgment based on warrant of attorney "in the
absence of a showing of the required waiver.""' (emphasis supplied).
"A statewide rule or legislation providing for a finding of proof of
intentional understanding and voluntary consent"'190 to the surrender
of the right to notice and real court appearance, would satisfy due
process, according to the three-judge court, and allow continued use
of the cognovit procedure in Pennsylvania.
Only the plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the district
court. They claimed error in the failure of the lower court to declare
the Pennsylvania cognovit system unconstitutional on its face, and to
extend the holding of the court on the necessity of positive proof of
understanding waiver, to the larger class of all signers of cognovit
instruments as proposed by plaintiffs, instead of limiting the holding
to a class earning under $10,000 per year. Rather then appealing,
the Pennsylvania attorney general joined the plaintiffs in urging in
the Supreme Court that the state's cognovit procedures were facially
unconstitutional."1
On this state of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed on the
basis of Overmeyer, (in effect giving its approval to the district
court's denial of any further relief to the plaintiffs), but withheld its
approval from other aspects of the district court judgment. The
Court found that in the absence of a cross-appeal, those aspects of
that judgment which were favorable to plaintiffs were not subject
to review."' Therefore, because of the significance the Court assigned
to the posture of the case on appeal and its consequent refusal to
deal in detail with its particular facts, Swarb v. Lennox is a very
narrow holding merely following Overmeyer and neither extending
nor limiting that precedent in the consumer context. A possible ex-
planation for the Court's reluctance to seize the opportunity it had in
Swarb to speak definitively about the use of cognovit clauses in con-
sumer financing can be found in the Court's closing observation that
"problems of this kind are peculiarly appropriate grist for the legis-
lative mill.""'
lMSwarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 199 (1972).
'9 Id. at 200.
"'Swaib v. Lennox, 314 F.Supp. 1091, at 1100-01 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
' Swath v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 200 (1972)
1 Id, at 200.01. Justice Douglas in dissent strongly criticised refusal to decide all the issues
presented in the lower court; he said "It is anomalous that an appellee by confessing error
can defeat an appeal." Id. at 207 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
113 Id, at 202.
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The case for the advantage to a debtor of the cognovit warning
clause is extremely thin. It depends on the willingness of users of the
clause to negotiate cognovit provisions, or to compete for business by
eliminating cognovit provisions voluntarily; any advantage to debtors
as a class is further attenuated by the improbability that an in-
creased number of debtors would be rendered sophisticated enough
to act in their own interests as a result of the knowledge gained from
the warning. In other contexts, warning clauses are regarded with
skepticism by consumer advocates.9
If the warning clause has such negligible utility to debtors, it
ought to follow that the constitutionality of the cognovit device is
unaffected, or at least not enhanced, by the warning provision. But
that may not be the case.
In Swarb the Supreme Court reiterated its observation in Over-
meyer "that other [more favorable to the debtor] legal consequences" '
might follow in a case marked by: (1) great disparities in bargain-
ing power; (2) a contract of adhesion; and (3) the absence of a
quid pro quo for a cognovit provision. But constitutionality does not
depend upon the harshness of contract terms. What is unconscionable
is not necessarily unconstitutional. Contracts evidencing the three
characteristics mentioned by the Court can be one-sided in many ways
totally unrelated to the cognovit clause. What saved the constitu-
tionality of the Ohio cognovit system, as applied in Overmeyer, was
that "Overmeyer, in its execution and delivery . . . of the second in-
stallment note containing the cognovit provision, voluntarily, intel-
ligently and knowingly waived the rights it otherwise possessed to
prejudgment notice and hearing, and . . . did so with full awareness
of the legal consequences." '96
In Swatb it was the absence of such intelligent, informed waiver
on the part of the designated class earning less than $10,00 per year
that led the district court to give such qualified relief to the plaintiffs
as was granted. The Supreme Court noted (albeit without comment)
the district court's observation that a rule or legislation insuring proof
of the informed basis for the waiver of rights would allow Pennsyl-
vania's cognovit system to continue even for those earning less than
$10,000. And since, in the Supreme Court's view, the cognovit prob-
lem is "grist for the legislative mill," the Ohio warning provision
tends to insulate the confession of judgment in Ohio from constitu-
tional attack. It would be difficult to imagine clearer or more explicit
language than that required in the warning clause. It makes gro-
194 Se note 167, supra.
1'5 Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 201 (1972).
19Id. at 187.
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tesquely clear the effect and possible consequences of signing a cog-
novit vote. The debtor's signature appears in close proximity to the
conspicuous printing contained in the warning. The possibility of
arguing ignorance of legal consequence, or of a court's finding such
ignorance, is sharply reduced, and the possibility of judicial control
of the cognovit clause is thereby severely undercut. Inasmuch as this
protection for real estate and other interests is achieved via a warn-
ing clause which is advantageous to few (if any) debtors, the price
paid by creditors for even a limited perpetuation of the cognovit sys-
tem is cheap. The public as a whole would be better off were the warn-
ing statute repealed, and the cognovit clause eliminated altogether.
32https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol22/iss3/4
